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1.  Introduction
all three German pension schemes between 1891 and 
1898, and Belgium between 1894 and 1903” (Briggs 
1961, 246-7). The seminal contribution by Collier und 
Messick (1975) is another early study analyzing the role 
of international spatial interdependencies for the diffu-
sion of social protection throughout the world.  
But it was only in the 1990s that the analysis of inter-
national influences on policy change gained momen-
tum with “Policy transfer studies” or “Policy diffusion 
studies” representing the two major research pro-
grams in the field. Although having a similar research 
objective, these two research programs differ in terms 
of methodologies applied. Whereas policy transfer stu-
dies are generally qualitative in orientation focusing on 
‘process-tracing’ as method to describe (and to a lesser 
extent) explain policy transfer, policy diffusion studies 
are mostly quantitative studies aiming at assessing the 
existence of policy transfer and explaining its under-
lying reasons. One drawback of studies on internati-
onal interdependencies is that the different research 
streams usually are considered separately from each 
other, although both are providing complementary 
methodologies. This review therefore deliberatively 
aims at jointly considering both research programs. 
This paper aims at critically assessing the current 
state of the art within both research programs with a 
specific focus on social protection and social policy 
respectively. It is the result of the first part of the joint 
research project International Policy Learning and 
Policy Change: Scientific Inputs for the Dialogue on 
Social Protection with Global Partners carried out by 
the International Centre for Sustainable Development 
of Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences in 
close cooperation with the program “Global Alliances 
for Social Protection” by the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). This paper 
is followed by an empirical study analyzing transfer 
processes in international policy networks in the field 
of social protection as the second part of the joint 
research project. 
To assess the current state of the art the paper 
addresses four guiding questions:
I. Are international interdependencies (policy 
   transfer/diffusion) relevant for policy outcomes?
   (Descriptive level)
II. Why does policy transfer/diffusion occur? 
   (Explanatory level)
III. Do international interdependencies improve 
    national policies (Normative level)?
IV. What (preliminary) lessons can be deduced 
    for the international dialogue with global 
    development partners on social protection?
The paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides an 
overview over the policy field of social protection 
in international cooperation. Chapter 3 summarizes 
the general theoretical debate on policy transfer and 
policy diffusion offering an introduction to both policy 
transfer and policy diffusion as approaches to cross-
national policy development. After defining the central 
terms ‘policy change’, ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy 
diffusion’ (chapter 3.1) mechanisms of policy diffusion 
and policy transfer identified in the literature (chapter 
3.2) and mediating variables influencing diffusion and 
transfer processes (chapter 3.3.) are discussed aa well 
as normative implications explored (chapter 3.4). Chap-
ter 4 provides a summary of empirical studies dealing 
with policy transfer and policy diffusion in social policy. 
Chapter 4.1 focusses on policy transfer studies and 
chapter 4.2 on policy diffusion studies. As the metho-
dologies between both research approaches differ, the 
guiding questions used for summarizing the literature 
differ slightly between both chapters as well. Chapter 5 
concludes by assessing lessons learnt and highlighting 
knowledge gaps and further research needs.
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So what explains why these policy changes take place 
or - the opposite case - why in some countries no 
policy changes take place? Traditionally, attempts 
to explain policy change focus on domestic factors, 
for example the role of political institutions, partisan 
structures or socio-economic conditions. However, 
apart from domestic factors, policy change can 
also be attributed to international influences and 
interdependencies. The possibility that countries do 
not constitute independent observational units is not 
new and is known as “Galton’s problem” (Ross and 
Homer 1976).1  
Considering the increasing role of social protection 
at the international level and the growing number of 
international policy networks dedicated to facilitate 
exchange about experiences in social protection among 
policy-makers, it is of interest to know more about the 
potential interactions at the international level have 
to eventually contribute to domestic policy change. 
In contrast to coercive mechanisms of international 
policy diffusion imposed by a supranational or interna-
tional entity (for example conditionalities imposed by 
IFIs), these international dialogues focus on voluntary 
exchanges such as mutual learning. Thus, a focus is 
placed on “soft governance” via horizontal processes. 
However, there is of course no automatism that policies 
are adopted simply because policy-makers observe 
“good working” policies in other countries.
The idea that international interdependencies matter 
for the spread of social protection is not new. Already 
in 1961 Asa Briggs wrote that “Bismarck’s reforms of 
the 1880s—laws of 1882, 1884 and 1889 introducing 
compulsory insurance against sickness, accidents, old 
age and invalidity—attracted immense interest in other 
European countries. Just as British factory legislation 
was copied overseas, so German social insurance stimu-
lated foreign imitation. Denmark, for instance, copied 
Over the past two decades many governments of 
low and middle income countries have started to 
introduce social protection measures or to extend 
the coverage and improve the functioning of public 
social protection systems. These reforms are a “global 
phenomenon” and can be observed in many African, 
Asian and Latin American countries. Likewise, social 
protection is gaining increasing importance at the 
international level. This is highlighted for example 
by the recent Communication on Social Protection 
in EU Development Cooperation by the European 
Commission, the adoption of the Recommendation on 
National Floors of Social Protection by the Interna-
tional Labour Conference 2012, or the current World 
Bank Social Protection and Labor Strategy 2012-2022. 
Further, international or regional policy networks on 
social protection are growing in number (e.g. Joint 
Learning Health Network, Inter-American Social Pro-
tection Network, Network for Social Security (NeSSt), 
Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board). 
Thus, there is a growing role of international dialogue 
on social protection.
Yet, even though these reforms are a global pheno-
menon, they are not uniform across countries. Soci-
al protection systems in place and reform strategies 
applied differ in terms of scope and characteristics. 
The characteristics of the reform processes themsel-
ves differ as well across countries both in terms of 
scope and speed of institutional change. Whereas in 
some countries reforms are directed at one particular 
pillar of social protection only, other countries have 
initiated comprehensive reform processes encom-
passing multiple pillars of social protection such as 
health, old age, and social assistance either simulta-
neously or gradually. In terms of speed some coun-
tries are continuously progressing on their reform 
paths, whereas in other countries reforms get stuck 
or even reversed.
1 “Galton’s problem” is termed after the anthropologist Sir Francis Galton and dates back to 1888. It refers to the problem of drawing inferences 
from separate elements/units as if they were independent whereas in fact they are mutually dependent (autocorrelation).
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2.1  Social protection - 
Sectoral characteristics
Depending on the underlying model for social protec-
tion various definitions of the term “social protection” 
itself exist. For example, in a Social State Model social 
protection is based on (a) the social insurance principle, 
meaning adequate, continuous income replacement in 
case of the occurrence of certain existential risks (social 
security), which is financed by income-related contri-
butions; and on (b) complementary social assistance, 
meaning residual economic or social support for poor 
and needy individuals or vulnerable groups of society, 
and which is means-tested and financed by taxes. The 
Welfare State Model in contrast aims at providing 
comprehensive social protection against all existen-
tial risks based on general provisions of public care 
and financed by taxes, thus applying universality and 
without means-testing. The main difference between 
the two approaches is therefore the extent to which 
responsibility for provision against common risks is 
shared between the individual and society (Bender et al. 
2007, p.14-18).
However, irrespective of the underlying model of social 
protection, income redistribution, risk pooling and 
risk sharing are the defining features of social protec-
tion. Combining these characteristics, social protection 
aims at protecting individuals and households from 
existence threatening risks (e.g. illness, age, unemploy-
ment) and protecting individuals and households who  
are not able to secure an income for themselves (e.g. 
due to age, invalidity, disability). 
Ensuring financial access to health systems and establi-
shing systems of old age protection as well as providing 
support to the poor and near-poor are currently among 
the core areas of political interest in low and middle 
income countries. Instruments of social protection 
cover a broad scope of approaches such as mandatory 
and voluntary contributory social insurance (the latter 
targeted in particular at informal sector workers in 
low and middle income countries), tax-financed non-
contributory universal or targeted social transfers or 
private and microinsurance.  
2.2  Social protection and its 
emergence on national and 
international policy agendas 
Many low and middle income countries are currently 
pursuing reforms extending the coverage of their pu-
blic social protection systems. Extension of coverage 
happens both in scope - by including previously ex-
cluded population groups - and in depth - by revising 
existing benefits. Prominent policy areas include the 
extension of social protection in health and social as-
sistance, in particular the extension of cash transfers. 
Within the area of social health protection low, lower 
middle and upper middle income countries all over 
the world are reforming existing health financing 
mechanisms towards extending coverage. Country ex-
amples include Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico in 
Latin America; China, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam in Asia or Ghana, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, or Zambia in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Social transfers, and cash transfers in particu-
lar, are spreading around the globe as well. In 2010 
cash transfer programs were operating in 52 countries 
(including 16 low income countries), covering 191.4 
million households including a total of 863.3 million 
beneficiaries worldwide (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa 
2011; Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa and Maitrot 2010). As of 
2012 cash transfer programs were discussed, planned 
or implemented in 35 out of a total of 47 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa reviewed by a recent study. 80% 
of these countries are low income countries, in which 
the emergence of new initiatives has been accelerating 
during the past decade (Garcia and Moore 2012).  
However, this current status quo is already the result 
of a long term process. At the country level the exten-
sion of social protection (sometimes with an explicit 
focus on universal coverage) has been emerging over 
(at least) the past 20 years on the national policy 
agenda in many low and middle income countries. The 
same is true for the international level, where already 
almost 20 years ago at the World Summit for Social 
Development in Copenhagen in 1995 governments 
committed themselves to “develop and implement 
policies to ensure that all people have adequate eco-
nomic and social protection during unemployment, ill 
health, maternity, child-rearing, widowhood, disability 
and old age.” Table 1 sketches the developments at the 
international level since 1995 in terms of international 
declarations made or strategies issued by international 
organizations. An acceleration of activities throughout 
the previous decade is discernible. 
2.  Background: 
Social protection in international cooperation
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Table 1: Social protection at the international level
1995 UN World Social Summit
1999 OECD: Pour un Mondiale Sociale – Le Nouvel Agenda Sociale, Paris
2000 UN: Enhancing Social Protection and reducing vulnerability in a globalizing world. Report of the 
Secretary General to the 39th session
Asian Development Bank (ADB): Social Protection for Equity and Growth
2001 World Bank: Social Protection Sector Strategy
Asian Development Bank (ADB): Social Protection Strategy
OECD-DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction
2003 ILO: Global Campaign for Social Security Coverage for all
2005 UNDP Human Development Report Office: New Thinking on Aid and Social Security, Occasional Paper
World Health Assembly (WHA): Resolution on “Sustainable Health Financing, Universal Coverage 
and Social Health Insurance”
2007 G8 Summit Declaration
2009 OECD DAC: Policy Statement on Social Protection and Employment
UN Chief Executive Board: Social Protection Floor
2010 G20: “Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth 2010”
High Level Panel on MDGs
European Development Report: “Social Protection for Inclusive Development - A New Perspective of 
EU Cooperation with Africa”
2011 G20: “Development cooperation priorities of the G20”
International Labour Conference: Resolutions and Conclusions on Social Protection (Social Security)
2012 International Labour Conference: Adoption of the “Recommendations concerning National Floors of 
Social Protection”
EU Commission: Communication on Social Protection in European Union Development Cooperation
World Bank: Social Protection Strategy 2012-2022
Source: Own compilation
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total amounts of financial flows in SSC have always 
been dominated by those of multilateral institutions 
and aid agencies in OECD/DAC-countries. This is parti-
ally due to the focus of SSC on financially less intensive 
technical cooperation. The notable exception is China. 
Ideally SSC is “guided by the principles of solidarity 
and non-conditionality, while promoting cooperation 
between developing countries” (Amorim/Dale 2013, 
p.5). Advantages that can be attributed to SSC are 
for example the greater adaptation to the needs of 
countries concerned, the greater sensitivity to specific 
contexts, the encouragement of reciprocal learning 
processes, the utilization of sectoral capabilities of 
MICs and the relatively low cost and faster execution 
(Morazán/Sanahuja/Ayllón 2011, p.7). However, these 
advantages have not yet been analyzed and therefore 
remain rather idealized.
During the first decade of the new millennium there 
has been an exponential rise in SSC projects and 
invested financial amounts. Most important actors in 
this scenario are Brazil, China, India and South Africa. 
Despite the long standing tradition of SSC these 
actors are often referred to as “New Donors”. The ma-
jority of the “New Donors” lack a centralized ministry 
or institution for their development efforts.  It can be 
argued that because of the relatively small amount of 
money invested by “New Donors” (an estimated 10% 
of the net flow of global aid), their mixed role between 
donor and recipient and their lack of institutionalized 
aid coordinating mechanisms, the future of the global 
aid regime will still be dominated by DAC-countries 
and principles (Quadir 2013, p.335).
Triangular/Trilateral Development Cooperation
Triangular or Trilateral Development Cooperation 
(TDC) are most commonly defined as “partner-
ships between DAC [OECD/Development assistant 
Committee] donors and pivotal countries (providers 
of South-South Co-operation) to implement develop-
ment cooperation programmes/projects in beneficia-
ry countries (recipients of development aid)” (Forde-
lone 2009, p.4).
Beside this common definition there are different 
forms of TDCs i.e. collaborations between two be-
neficiary countries and one DAC-donor or between 
two pivotal countries and one DAC-donor. One of the 
intentions behind TDC-projects is the integration of 
pivotal countries/“New Donors” into the internatio-
nal (OECD/DAC-standard) consensus. Also a closer 
relationship between Northern/DAC-donors and 
pivotal countries is anticipated. Furthermore, similar to 
SSC-projects, the utilization of cost benefits in pivotal 
countries can be expected (Altenburg/Weikert 2006, 
p.4-10). These kinds of projects have been criticized 
for missing the intended learning effects and for solely 
focusing on the efficient use of financial and human 
resources (BMZ 2013, p.6).
The analysis of TDC still has several obstacles to 
overcome. Publications about the theoretical outlines 
of the TDC-topics and empirically-based analyses of TDC-
projects are still rare (Langendorf et al 2012, p.15). 
Further, there is a lack of studies examining the aspect 
of cost-effectiveness. Despite the underdeveloped 
area of analysis some factors for successful TDC have 
been established. Among them is the importance of 
“ownership” of the beneficiary countries which means 
that the conception of projects has to consider their 
demands (Langendorf/Müller 2011, p.7).
Global Development Partners
Global Development Partners (GDP) is a relatively new 
concept of Partnership in Development Cooperation 
mainly used by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). GDPs 
are those outstanding countries of the global south 
that possess regional social, political and economic 
weight and therefore have the capacity to shape glo-
bal processes (BMZ 2011, p.6-7). The GDP-concept 
replaces the former concept of anchor countries. This 
approach pays credit to the increased importance of 
emerging countries. 
Cooperation with GDPs focuses on climate change and 
the protection of global public goods, the promotion 
of sustainable economic development which inclu-
des a pro-reform economic policy, and the conti-
nuous exchange and dialogue on global development 
issues and goals (BMZ 2011, p.11-12). According to 
BMZ, cooperation with GDPs has two dimensions: 
first, bilateral cooperation and second, international 
cooperation together with GDPs in order to influence 
regional as well as global development agendas. This 
second dimension further extends to those emerging 
countries that are of regional importance and do not 
receive development aid, e.g. China.
International Policy Networks
Networks have emerged as specific forms of gover-
nance in which actors are not embedded in a formal 
hierarchy. Reiterative relations between interde-
pendent actors make up the structure of a network. 
Factors determining network structure are actors’ be-
havior, the intensity of their connection, and the power 
they hold. Networks can further be distinguished by 
their goals, degree of institutionalization, and geo-
graphic set-up (Springer Gabler Verlag). Additionally, 
networks are defined by the types of actors involved. 
Policy networks denote those networks that are 
involved in political processes. They deal with specific 
policy fields (see Knill/Schäfer 2014). 
Policy networks have gained practical relevance inter-
nationally over the past decades addressing issue areas 
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The current reform wave originating in the 1990s 
and accelerating during the past decade differs from 
another – partially overlapping - wave dating back to 
the 1980s and 1990s, when debates on social policy 
were closely linked to debates on economic structu-
ral reforms. Then, reforms were primarily driven by 
cost considerations and the need to relieve burdens 
on fiscal budgets. The “liberal welfare agenda” was 
characterized by shifting the balance between public 
and private sectors in both financing and provision 
towards private involvement; reorganizing the public 
sector itself; and on targeting social spending to the 
most vulnerable groups, e.g. greater emphasis on basic 
social services, targeted anti-poverty programs and 
social safety nets (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008: 183-
185). Prominent examples include the privatization 
of pension reforms in Chile and its spill-over to other 
Latin American countries or the introduction of user 
fees in many African countries.
2.3  Governance structures 
in international cooperation in 
social protection 
The past few years have seen changes in the gover-
nance structures of development cooperation. Classical 
bilateral North-South development cooperation or 
multilateral development cooperation have been 
supplemented with alternative forms of develop-
ment cooperation. The following chapter gives an 
overview over selected concepts of these “new” forms 
of cooperation.
South-South-Cooperation
The concept of South-South-Cooperation (SSC) and 
its practical applications already have a long stan-
ding tradition, starting from 1940s with the Bandung 
Conference in 1955 and the Buenos Aires Action Plan 
of 1978 as important waypoints. Thus, these forms of 
cooperation are not new phenomena as such. Still, the 
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such as environmental protection, economic policy, 
and social protection. Two types of policy networks in 
the international sphere can be distinguished, namely 
transnational and transgovernmental policy networks. 
Whereas a wider range of actors participate in trans-
national policy networks, including non-governmental 
actors such as businesses, NGO’s, and issue experts, 
transgovernmental networks are mainly open to units 
of national governments. Transgovernmental policy 
networks according to Slaughter (2004) can be disag-
3.  International policy transfer/diffusion and 
policy change – Theoretical background
gregated into three categories. Information networks 
are based on the exchange of information, dissemina-
tion of best practices and support regarding technical 
issues. Harmonization networks serve the develop-
ment of shared regulatory standards, also with regard 
to international agreements. Enforcement networks 
help states comply with standards that have insuf-
ficient capacities or are inexperienced regarding the 
respective regulations (also see Jakobi 2009; Slaughter 
and Hale 2014). 
3.1  Policy transfer, policy diffusion 
and policy change - Definitions 
and typologies 
Policy change
According to Hall’s widely perceived conceptualization 
of policy change (1993), three variables can be disag-
gregated in the policymaking process: “the overar-
ching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the 
techniques or policy instruments used to attain those 
goals, and the precise settings of these instruments” 
(Hall 1993, p. 278). Following from there, Hall distingu-
ishes between first order, second order and third order 
change. First order change is understood as “the process 
whereby instrument settings are changed in the light of 
experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals 
and instruments of policy remain the same” (Hall 1993, 
p. 278). Second order change has taken place “when the 
instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered 
in response to past experience even though the overall 
goals of policy remain the same” (Hall 1993, p. 278, 279). 
Third order change, accordingly, presents a wholesale 
change, and thus “simultaneous changes in all three 
components of policy: the instrument settings, the ins-
truments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind 
policy” (Hall 1993, p. 279). A goal shift includes first and 
second order changes.
With respect to social protection a first order change 
relates to e.g. changes in contribution rates or benefits. A 
second-order change relates to a change in instruments 
such as changing health provider payment mechanisms 
within social health protection or targeting methods in 
social assistance. A third-order change implies a goal shift, 
e.g. shifting from individual responsibility to redistribution.2
Policy transfer
The term policy transfer was coined by Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000) and defined as “the process, by which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrange-
ments, institutions and ideas in one political system 
(past or present) is used in the development of policies 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 
p. 5).3 The following section aims to give an overview 
over the forms, scope, actors, objects and degrees of 
policy transfer (see also table 2).
• Forms: The policy transfer approach distinguishes 
between voluntary, negotiated, and coercive forms of 
transfer and thereby tries to answer the question as to 
why actors engage in transfer processes (see Dolowitz 
and Marsh 2000, p. 8; Evans 2008, p. 8). Coercive policy 
transfers occur when political units are forced to adopt 
certain policies by other actors, e.g. states or inter-
national or supranational organizations. Negotiated 
transfer processes take place when decision makers 
are compelled to change their policies in exchange 
for loans or grants. Furthermore, the literature often 
equates voluntary policy transfer with lesson-drawing 
(e.g. Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Evans 2004, p. 3; 2008) 
or policy learning (Toens/Landwehr 2008) by treating 
“voluntary policy transfer […] as a process in which po-
licies implemented elsewhere are examined by rational 
political actors for their potential utilization within 
another political system” (Evans 2008, p. 7). However, 
this equalization leaves out other mechanisms that 
have been identified in the study of cross-national po-
licy developments and which will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 3.2.
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2 It should be noted that policy change and reform are not necessarily identical term. For a conceptualization of the term “social protection 
reform” see for example Bender (2013). 
3 However straightforward this definition seems, it has been acknowledged by various scholars that policy transfer does not represent a cohe-
rent theoretical concept, and analytical categories still remain open for discussion (Lütz 2007, p. 142). The explanatory value of policy transfer 
remains controversial/weak (see Evans 2004, p. 5). Rather, it is maintained that policy transfer was developed as an umbrella heading compiling 
several approaches to policymaking (Evans 2004, p. 20), as an analytical tool (Hulme 2005, p. 418) that can be linked to different theories to 
understand policy processes (Lütz 2007, p. 132), or as a set of research questions (Dolowitz/Marsh 2000, p. 8). 
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• Scope: According to Dolowitz and Marsh, policy 
transfer has both a temporal and a spatial dimension. 
Policies can be transferred from a political unit’s own 
past (temporal), another political unit’s past (temporal, 
spatial), or another political unit’s current legislation 
(spatial). The focus is on transfers which include a 
spatial dimension.4  
• Agents: Agents of transfer can take many forms, 
ranging from state officials (politicians, bureaucrats) to 
policy entrepreneurs, academicians and other experts 
within ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992), internati-
onal and supranational organizations, global financial 
institutions or non-governmental and transnational 
advocacy networks as pressure groups (see Evans 
2008, p. 7).  
• Objects of transfer: Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, 
p. 12) identify eight potential categories for policy 
transfer, namely policy goals, policy content, policy 
instruments, policy programs, institutions, ideologies, 
ideas and attitudes and negative lessons. Thus, the 
term “policy” is used in a very broad sense.
• Degrees of transfer: The degree to which policies 
are transferred can vary. With reference to Rose 
(1993), Dolowitz and Marsh distinguish between four 
degrees of transfer, namely “copying, which invol-
ves direct and complete transfer; emulation, which 
involves transfer of the ideas behind the policy or 
program; combinations, which involve mixtures of 
several different policies; and inspiration, where policy 
in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change, but 
where the final outcome does not actually draw upon 
the original” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p. 13).
Policy diffusion
Maggetti and Gilardi define policy diffusion as “the pro-
cess whereby policy choices in one unit are influenced 
by policy choices in other units” (2013, p. 3). Rogers 
understands policy diffusion as “the process in which 
an innovation is communicated through certain chan-
nels over time among the members of a social system” 
(Rogers in Lütz 2007, p. 132). As such, policy diffusion is 
generally concerned with the spread of policy between 
policy units, with interdependence being its defining 
characteristic. Units can be of various nature with 
regard to level (international, transnational, national, 
subnational etc.) and type (country, city, public organi-
zations, firms etc.) (see Maggetti/Gilardi 2013, p. 3). 
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Forms Coercive; negotiated; voluntary
Scope Temporal and spatial dimension
Agents/actors
Politicians; bureaucrats; policy entrepreneurs (including think tanks); knowledge insti-
tutions; academicians and other experts; pressure groups; global financial institutions; 
international organizations; supra-national institutions …
Objects
Policy goals; policy content; policy instruments; policy programs; institutions; ideolo-
gies; ideas and attitudes; negative lessons
Degrees Copying; adaptation; hybridization/combination/synthesis; inspiration/influence
Table 2: Categories of policy transfer
4 Although cases studied mostly include a spatial dimension, the question of whether cases that lack the spatial dimension and thus represent 
intra-organizational transfer should be included into the study of policy transfer is not yet settled (see Evans 2004)).
It is possible to distinguish between a narrow and a 
broad conceptualization of policy diffusion (see figure 
1). In its narrow conceptualization policy diffusion is 
understood as a de-central mode of policy coor-
dination characterized by the absence of a central 
governing instance (e.g. the state; supra-national 
institutions). Diffusion in this sense is understood as a 
horizontal approach to policy development whereby 
actors voluntarily and unilaterally adopt policies from 
other settings without getting anything in return (see 
Busch/Jörgens 2007, p. 59). 
Figure 1: Policy diffusion
Policy diffusion (broad definition)
no central actors, 
voluntary,
de-central coordination
Policy diffusion
(narrow definition)
mediated:
‘institutionalized policy transfer’
(e.g. via international organizations, 
epistemic communities, 
advocacy coalition networks, 
mesolevel networks)
central actor, 
cooperation
coercion, international harmonization
multi- / bilateral agreements
direct:
tipping points / critical mass,
critical countries
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3.2.2  Voluntary mechanisms
3.2.2.1  Learning
Policy learning is generally understood as “the acqui-
sition of new relevant information that permits the 
updating of beliefs about the effects of a new policy” 
(Braun et al. 2007, p. 42). In this view, decision makers 
are (bounded) rational actors interested in finding 
solutions to pressing problems. Learning supports the 
decision between alternative policy options. Scanning 
other jurisdictions and making use of experiences of 
other countries forms the basis of policy learning, 
helping decision makers to evaluate the effects of 
alternative and prospective policies. The literature 
distinguishes between rational learning or lesson-
drawing (Rose 1993), which presupposes fully rational 
actors and perfect information, and bounded lear-
This locates policy diffusion in between top-down 
approaches whereby policy adoptions are the result 
of external pressure or harmonization, and bottom-up 
approaches that seek to explain policy outcomes with re-
ference to internal (e.g. domestic) variables. This concepti-
on of policy diffusion seeks to explain how political actors 
coordinate in the absence of hierarchy by communication 
(observation) and can be defined as “the spreading of 
innovations due to communication instead of hierarchy or 
collective decision making within international institu-
tions” (Tew in Holzinger et al. 2007, p. 15). In this narrow 
sense the study of policy diffusion aims to shed light on 
“governance by diffusion” (see Busch/Jörgens 2007, p. 68). 
A broader conceptualization of policy diffusion includes 
interdependent spreads of policy motivated by any type 
of motive force such as harmonization, multilateral and 
bilateral agreements and de-central policy coordination. 
This broader conceptualizations is predominantly found 
in earlier studies, which tend to answer questions such as 
whether or not policies diffuse, how fast they do so, and 
who is involved in the process. 
Further, the literature distinguishes between direct 
and mediated policy diffusion, whereby mediated 
diffusion is also understood as the ‘institutionalization 
of policy transfer’ by establishing networks for infor-
mation and communication flows (see Busch/Jörgens 
2007, p. 70). Within mediated diffusion, information 
can be accessed simultaneously by any actors involved. 
International Organizations, epistemic communities, 
transnational advocacy networks etc. help facilitate and 
accelerate communication and information flows, and 
are at the same time important transfer agents in policy 
transfer processes (see above). Direct diffusion is indicated 
by dynamics such as critical mass or tipping points, whereby 
once a certain amount of political units adopt certain poli-
cies, others will follow more quickly. An alternative concept 
is that of critical countries, whereby prestigious countries 
are more often imitated (see Busch/Jörgens 2007, p. 71, 72).
3.2  Mechanisms of international 
policy transfer/policy diffusion
The literature discusses several mechanisms of policy 
transfer and policy diffusion. At first, it is possible to 
distinguish between coercive or voluntary policy trans-
fer/diffusion, the latter referring to horizontal coordi-
nation. Mechanisms of voluntary policy transfer/diffu-
sion include learning, emulation and competition. All 
of those can be understood as communication based 
mechanisms, if observation is understood as a form 
of communication. In order to give an overview over 
possible diffusion and transfer mechanisms as well as 
influencing framework requirements (moderating va-
riables), we will discuss each in the following section. 
The following discussion is primarily based on the po-
licy diffusion literature as the policy transfer literature 
does not clearly specify explanatory variables. Figure 2 
provides an overview of the variables discussed.
3.2.1  Coercion
Coercion occurs when political units are forced to ad-
opt certain policies by other actors, e.g. states or inter-
national or supranational organizations. Conditionality 
can be considered as one form of coercion. Coercion 
is a top-down measure and as such not a horizontal 
governance mechanisms as those emphasized by the 
narrow definition of policy diffusion. Unfortunately, 
there exists no consistent categorization of coercive 
and voluntary processes (see Holzinger/Knill 2007, 
p. 89), which consequently leads to rather intuitive 
classification of transfer processes by the various 
scholars. Thus, policy transfers that were motivated by 
international agreements within IOs, or best practices 
have been classified as coercive transfers and voluntary 
transfers at the same time by different scholars on the 
basis of different reasoning (see Holzinger/Knill 2007, 
p. 89, 90).
Figure 2: Explaining policy diffusion and policy transfer - Overview
ning, whereby actors use relevant information readily 
available to them (“cognitive shortcuts”, see Braun et 
al. 2007, p. 42; Meseguer 2005, p. 72). This learning 
mechanism is directly related to the performance of 
a policy, e.g. whether it is successful or not. Maggetti 
and Gilardi distinguish three types of success, namely 
“(a) the goals that the policy is designed to achieve, (b) 
the challenges of its implementation, and (c) its politi-
cal support” (Maggetti/Gilardi 2013, p. 4). Learning by 
policy makers includes all of these aspects. Policy lear-
ning can result in different degrees of policy transfer/
diffusion specified above, but does not have to lead to 
transfer/diffusion, if so called “negative lessons” are 
drawn (see Holzinger/Knill 2007, p. 93).
Voluntary mechanisms
Policy learning
(rational, bounded rational)
Emulation
(socialization, legitimacy)
Competition
(economic, political, social)
Policy diffusions / Policy transfer
Moderating varables
Policy and problem
characteristics
Proximy and 
Similarity
International 
embeddedness
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3.2.2.2  Emulation
The underlying theoretical assumption of emulation 
in contrast to that of learning is that political units aim 
to conform to their normative environment (Maggetti/
Gilardi 2013, p. 4). As Gilardi (2012) points out refer-
ring to Checkel (2005) and March and Olsen (1998) 
emulation differs from all other mechanisms: Whereas 
learning, competition and coercion rely on the “logic 
of consequences”, i.e. in one way or another choosing 
by evaluating the consequences of alternative actions, 
emulation relies on the “logic of appropriateness”, 
where action “involves evoking an identity or role 
to a specific situation” (Gilardi 2012, p. 22). Decision 
makers are not so much interested in effective policy 
solutions. Instead, “the symbolic and socially construc-
ted characteristics are crucial” (Maggetti/Gilardi 2013, 
p. 4) to decisions taken by policy makers. This makes 
emulation “a ‘blind’ action in that it does not entail en-
hanced reflection about the mapping from policies to 
outcomes […]” (Meseguer 2005, p. 79), which can lead 
to the adoption of policies widely accepted and valued 
highly, and conversely, to the dismissal of policies that 
might be beneficial but do not enjoy the same accep-
tance or even present a taboo (see Maggetti/Gilardi 
2013, p. 4). Thus, emulation might facilitate the public 
acceptance or feasibility of a policy change, but in 
terms of outcomes, it may not lead to improvement or 
even to a deterioration of a given situation. It is argued 
that emulation typically implies copying of foreign 
policies (see Holzinger/Knill 2007, p. 94). 
 
It is possible to distinguish between at least two dif-
ferent channels of emulation. According to Meseguer, 
“Governments may imitate what peer countries do 
simply because they are peers, or governments may 
imitate what apparently successful countries do simply 
because they are high-status countries that are consi-
dered to know best” (Meseguer 2005, p. 73). This ‘ta-
ken for grantedness’ can either happen on the basis of 
shared socialization and the development of common 
norms among peers or be a result of policies being un-
derstood as appropriate and therefore as being taken 
for granted. As Braun et al. put it, “[p]olitical rights for 
women have spread as a result of their being progres-
sively taken for granted as an essential component of 
citizenship” (Braun et al. 2007, p. 43). 
The quest for legitimacy or also termed symbolic 
imitation constitutes another form of emulation. 
This mechanism describes the adoption of policies 
by decision makers as a way to “enhance their status, 
credibility, or ‘modernity’” (see Meseguer 2005, p. 76). 
The adoption of policies that conform to prevailing 
normative structures can also function as a ‘ceremony’ 
protecting policy-makers from criticisms (Meyr and 
Rowan 1977 cited in Braun and Gilardi 2006, p.312). 
As an example of symbolic imitation Braun et al. point 
out that “it has been argued that the establishment of 
independent central banks was less linked to attempts 
to fight inflation than to the need for governments to 
show their alignment to socially valued policy-making 
models” (Braun et al. 2007, p. 44).
‘Taken for grantedness’ impacts on how policy-ma-
kers subjectively judge the effectiveness of a given 
policy, whereas ‘symbolic imitation’ influences the 
utility policy-makers attach to a given policy (Braun 
and Gilardi 2006, p. 313).
3.2.2.3  Competition
Competition can refer to either economic, political 
or social competition. Economic competition occurs 
when states react strategically to one another in order 
to attract or retain resources (see Holzinger/Knill 2007, 
p. 92; Maggetti/Gilardi 2013, p. 5). Depending on the 
policy area (process vs. product regulation), competi-
tion can lead to a regulatory “race to the bottom”, e.g. 
lowering process costs in order to increase economic 
competitiveness, or under certain conditions conver-
sely to a “race to the top” (see Holzinger/Knill 2007, 
p. 92), e.g. raising product standards in order to keep 
products manufactured in countries with low product 
standards from entering the market. Political and 
social competition are mentioned less frequently than 
economic competition. Political competition occurs 
when states aim to adopt the role of international 
leaders or early followers in order to influence inter-
national policy developments and thereby minimizing 
adaptation costs (Busch and Jörgens 2007, p.73).5 
Social competition or ‘structural equivalence’ denotes 
a relationship shared by two entities towards a third 
party. In order to stabilize this relationship, these two 
entities observe and if necessary imitate each other 
(see Busch/Jörgens 2007, p. 74).
3.2.3  Links and interrelationships
It is often stated in the literature that diffusion and 
transfer processes are usually caused by a mix of 
mechanisms. However, the literature still falls short on 
showing how mechanisms interact with one another 
(see Marsh/Sharman 2008, p. 33), and what role coun-
try-specific factors play (see Braun et al. 2007, p. 44). 
Further, the additive handling of these mechanisms 
poses theoretical challenges.6 For a fuller understan-
ding it is necessary to explore if the factors addressed 
are in a complementing, substitutive, competitive or 
in no relationship with each other at all (Kemmerling 
2007, S.160).7 Braun et al. accordingly conclude that 
this “’vague theory’ […] leads to a simplified view 
of diffusion process that neglects the possibility of 
“conjunctural” and “multiple” causation […], that is, 
the fact that the effects of learning, for example, may 
depend on country-specific factors, and that different 
paths may lead to the same outcome (for example, 
some countries may learn while others imitate)” (2007, 
p. 44, 45). Consequently, it remains difficult to deduce 
links and interrelationships between mechanisms from 
the current state of the art. The systematic interactions 
between mechanisms remain to be studied both the-
oretically as well as empirically in future research (see 
Holzinger/Knill 2007, p. 105). 
3.3  Framework requirements 
(Moderating variables)
Diffusion and transfer processes cannot be explained 
by pointing to different mechanisms and information 
flows only. The literature mentions several mode-
rating variables which influence the likelihood or 
propensity of policy transfer/diffusion. These variab-
les include policy specific qualities, similarities among 
and countries, and international aspects (see Busch/
Jörgens 2007, p. 74):
• Policy specific qualities: It is maintained that 
policies with a higher potential for domestic conflict 
of interests diffuse more slowly. Thus, redistributive 
policies would be expected to diffuse more slowly than 
regulative policies due to their high potential to cause 
conflicts between national interest groups (see Lütz 
2007, p. 141; Holzinger et al. 2007, p. 30, 31). Further, 
problem structures influence diffusion and transfer 
with regard to the visibility and intensity of domestic 
problems and the solutions they require, e.g. first order 
policy changes such as simple technical solutions or  
changes in institutional or political paths (Busch/Jör-
gens 2007, p. 74). 
5 However, contrary to this position it is also possible to argue that countries refrain from acting as international leader or policy innovators in 
order to save the costs of innovation. 
6 It has been mentioned above that policy transfer studies often equate voluntary policy transfer with lesson-drawing and policy learning. It can 
be understood though, that policy transfer processes are motivated by all of the mechanisms explained above.
7 Cao (2010) is the only study known to the authors explicitly considering this interaction by focusing on the relationship between learning and 
competition: Learning might be motivated by deciding between alternative options in order to improve performance. But leaning might also be 
induced by competition, e.g. adopting innovations from other countries are adopted in order to save innovation costs, which would reduce the 
overall level of innovations (Cao 2010).
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• Proximity and similarities between countries: Proxi-
mity and similarities between countries are said to po-
sitively influence diffusion and transfer processes (see 
Lütz 2007, p. 139; Holzinger et al. 2007, p. 30; Busch/
Jörgens 2007, p. 74). Proximity basically refers to geo-
graphic proximity. Similarities include socio-economic 
similarities (e.g. same level of economic development, 
similar demographics), but also cultural and institu-
tional similarities. Cultural similarities can refer to a 
common language, religion, and shared values such as 
individualism or equality. Decision makers might look 
to those countries for models with which they have 
tight cultural relations, and their openness for certain 
policies might be restrained by ‘cognitive filters’ (see 
Holzinger et al. 2007, p. 30.8 Further, diffusion of cer-
tain policies might depend on the institutional set up, 
whereby institutional similarities between countries 
positively influence diffusion and transfer (Holzinger 
et al. 2007, p. 30).9 As an example, studies suggest that 
Unitarian, pluralist and corporatist countries might 
each choose different policies (see Lütz 2007, p. 139). 
• International embeddedness: Diffusion and transfer 
processes can be positively influenced by the degree to 
which a country is embedded internationally in com-
munication networks or international organizations 
(see Lütz 2007, p. 140).  
3.4  Normative implications
It is important to note, that voluntary policy trans-
fer/policy diffusion do not automatically induce an 
improvement in the functioning of domestic policies. 
Firstly, even if learning is the dominant mechanism, 
policy-makers surely do not consider the implications 
of a specific policy only, but also the political outcomes 
of a policy change (see also Gilardi 2010).9 Secondly, 
learning based on cognitive shortcuts (“bounded rati-
onality”) might imply that important implications of a 
policy are not considered. The same holds for transfer/
diffusion induced by emulation which might increase 
the domestic acceptance of policy changes, but not 
necessarily their effectiveness. 
In this context, Dolowitz and Marsh distinguish three 
types of transfer that influence policy success or fai-
lure, by defining successful policy transfer as achieving 
the goals governments set prior to engaging in policy 
transfer (see 2000, p. 17), namely uninformed trans-
fer, incomplete transfer, and inappropriate transfer. 
Uninformed transfer occurs when governments “have 
insufficient information about the policy/institution 
and how it operates in the country from which it is 
transferred” (Dolowitz/Marsh 2000, p. 17). Incomplete 
transfer denotes the exclusion of “crucial elements 
of what made the policy or institutional structure a 
success in the originating country” from the transfer 
process (Dolowitz/Marsh 2000, p. 17). Inappropriate 
transfer occurs when “insufficient attention may be 
paid to the differences between the economic, social, 
political and ideological contexts in the transferring and 
the borrowing country” (Dolowitz/Marsh 2000, p. 17).
3.5  Interim conclusions
The studies of policy diffusion and policy transfer both 
aim to pay credit to interdependency in policymaking. 
Both policy transfer and policy diffusion studies link 
internal processes of policy making with policy deve-
lopments in the external political environment, thereby 
incorporating the dynamics of border-crossing into 
the analysis of policy development. Thus, awareness of 
policy developments in other political units is the defi-
ning characteristic of both policy transfer and diffusi-
on. Both approaches can be applied to the description 
and analysis of policy change at different levels, inclu-
ding international, transnational, national, sub-national 
state, regional and local levels. An important analytical 
8 Please note the conceptual overlap to emulation, which is one of the independent variables explaining policy transfer/diffusion. See also 
the critical assessment of the current state of the art in section 3.5
. 
9 A noteworthy exception is Braun and Gilardi (2008) who put forward a unified model based on expected utility-theory.
implication is that from a normative point of view 
policy diffusion or policy transfer do not automatically 
imply an improvement in domestic policy making (e.g. 
improving the performance of policies).
Apart from interdependence via coercion three diffe-
rent voluntary mechanisms are suggested - specifically 
by the literature on policy diffusion - through which 
policies are internationally diffused (learning, emulati-
on, competition).  In addition, the theoretical literature 
suggests different framework requirements which im-
pact on the responsiveness of one country to pick up 
policies from another country (specific qualities of the 
policy and policy problem itself, proximity and similari-
ty among countries, international embeddedness).
However, as has been stated by various scholars (see 
Marsh/Sharman 2008, p. 32; Maggetti/Gilardi 2013, p. 
2, 3), policy diffusion and policy transfer approaches 
are still characterized by theoretical heterogeneity, 
ambiguity and openness. In this context at least three 
aspects need to be pointed out: 
• No uniform theoretical background: Mechanisms 
considered in the study of both transfer and diffusi-
on do not share one theoretical background (Braun 
et al. 2007, p. 39, 40), lack theoretical grounding (see 
Graham et al. 2012: 21), and often apply incoherent 
operationalization (Maggetti/Gilardi 2013). Thus, they 
present an assemblage of mechanisms, and are often 
simply added up. Braun et al. (2007) point out that 
the different mechanisms presuppose different types 
of actors, and attach different weight to agency and 
structure. In their words, “rationalist mechanisms neg-
lect social structures, while constructivist mechanisms 
neglect agency” (2007, p. 44). Consequently, studies are 
characterized by the inclusion of “as many mechanisms 
as the data allow in a simple, additive fashion” (Braun 
et al. 2007, p. 44), although they actually might be 
incommensurable.
• Inter-linkages/Interrelationships between diffusi-
on/transfer mechanisms, framework requirements 
and domestic factors: Further, inter-linkages between 
mechanisms are not considered: The propensity to 
learn might surely be influenced by shared social 
norms or shared socialization. Competition might as 
well increase incentives to learn. Also the relationship 
between mechanisms and framework requirements is 
not specified. For example, proximity and similarity of 
countries might be highly correlated with emulation 
in the sense of shared norms. Or similarity in terms of 
quest for legitimacy might be linked to competition. 
The current state of the art does not address these 
relationships at all, thus it is still very vague. Last but 
not least, the relationship between international inter-
dependencies and domestic factors is not theoretically 
analyzed in a systematic way.  
• Organizational structures shaping interaction 
among policy-makers: Both strands of research 
mention the role of ‘policy networks’ or ‘mediated 
diffusion’. However, how this works, i.e. the impact 
of institutional respectively organizational structures 
through which actors are linked to each other on diffu-
sion/transfer has not been addressed in a meaningful 
way (see also chapter 5.2). As mechanisms addressed 
are said to rely on communication and observation res-
pectively, the structures which shape communication 
and observation are of importance. 
Thus, theories on policy diffusion and policy transfer 
can offer guidance for empirical research but this 
guidance is still severely inhibited by the shortcomings 
mentioned above. 
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4.  Policy transfer/policy diffusion and 
policy change in social policy – Empirical studies
4.1.  Policy transfer
The following chapter will examine four cases where 
policy transfer took place. The guiding questions will be:
• Did policy transfer occur?
• To what degree was the original policy transferred?
• How can the result be explained, i.e. what are the 
   factors for success or failure?
• Which framework conditions respectively 
   mediating variables can be observed?
• In which part of the policy-cycle did the 
   transfer happen?
Not all of these questions can be answered for every 
project. Precise literature and evaluations remain 
scarce. Further, not every case study gave answers to 
all our guiding questions. 
4.1.1  Policy transfer in Brazil’s 
international policies
South-south-cooperation is an important pillar of 
Brazilian foreign policy. Projects in this area are often 
focused on social protection or social security. The 
Brazilian model of social protection emphasizes social 
assistance as a right. It is decentralized but demands 
strong coordination between the different levels of 
the political system. Furthermore, civil society and the 
private sector are generally involved in the implemen-
tation process (Leite/Suyama/Pomeroy 2013, p.4). 
4.1.1.1  Bolsa Escola 
One of the most famous and most discussed examples 
of policy transfer is the Brazilian “Bolsa Escola”-program. 
“Bolsa Escola” is a Conditional-Cash-Transfer program 
(CCT). In this case families were granted a certain 
amount of money when their children had an attendance 
of 85% at school. It was preceded by similar programs 
at the local level in the mid-1990s. In 2001 the program 
was launched nationwide (Britto 2005, p.10-11). The first 
phase of “Bolsa Escola” from 1995-2001 is an example 
of policy transfer within one country. Starting with 
two Brazilian cities in 1995 the program was imple-
mented by 88 cities until 1997 and by 200 cities until 
the nationwide launch in 2001 (Sugiyama 2005, p. 
198). As Sugiyama shows the implementation of this 
innovative measure does not originate in political in-
centives in electoral competition. Rather, the ideology 
of the main actors and the links between the city and 
the professional network mattered (Sugiyama 2005, p. 
207-209).
“Bolsa Escola” (as well as the Mexican “Progresa”) was 
originally implemented mostly without international 
pressure. In those cases the World Bank (WB) and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) played an 
important consulting role but did not take a coercive 
role. However, the international leverage did play a 
role in the replication of the CCT approach in other 
South American countries. CCT-programs already 
featured many characteristics International Organi-
zations were looking for, but their visibility to them 
was further enhanced  by evaluations of the examples 
from Mexico and Brazil  and the connection of the 
program´s designers to the above mentioned financial 
institutions (Britto 2005, p.22-23).  
Lana and Evans emphasize the important role of 
knowledge institutions and/or “policy entrepreneurs” 
in the diffusion of a program like “Bolsa Escola”. The 
success of the example is closely related to Christovam 
Buarque and his organization “Missao Crianca”. The 
organization employed many key experts from the 
original “Bolsa Escola” program and was very active 
in promoting the concept to governments and NGOs 
(Lana/Evans 2004, p.198-200). Beyond that they got 
involved in the process of policy implementation. The 
involvement of “Missao Crianca” in this case shows 
how knowledge institutions can benefit the diffusion 
process. In addition to their deeper knowledge in the 
relevant issues, they offer a higher degree of accounta-
bility and effectiveness (Lana/Evans 2004, p.201). 
“Missao Crianca” established a very good reputation 
with International Organizations like the WB or the 
UNESCO. This led to their involvement in the transfer 
of “Bolsa Escola” to Ecuador. In 1999 Ecuador faced 
a severe financial and economic crisis which led to a 
downward spiral in the living conditions of many Ecu-
adorian families. The government was not able to re-
solve the problems and so they turned to the WB and 
the IDB for help. “Missao Crianca” was subsequently 
introduced into the Ecuadorian reform process by the-
se organizations because the approach of “Bolsa Esco-
la” was seen as a promising solution for the Ecuadorian 
problems, and “Missao Crianca” knew how to conduct 
such a project. Ecuador itself did not have much say 
in the selection of a strategy but had to be convinced 
nevertheless (Lana/Evans 2004, p.204-206). Although 
some elements from the Brazilian model have been left 
out in the actual implementation in Ecuador and have 
been altered to fit into the different cultural context, 
respectively, the overall scheme remains similar.    
4.1.1.2  Solidarity in literacy program 
“Alfabetizacao Solidaria (Alfasol)” was created in Brazil 
in 1997 as a program to “reduce adult illiteracy rates” 
and “to induce the public provision of Young and Adult 
Education in the country” (Morais 2005, p.16). “Alfasol” 
was coordinated and later actively promoted by the 
NGO “Association for the Support in of the Solida-
rity in Literacy Program (AAPAS)”. The program was 
designed in a partnership structure. Not only were 
different levels of public governments involved, but 
also enterprises, NGOs, universities and citizens. Es-
pecially the universities were important partners. They 
were responsible for the training of teachers and the 
monitoring/evaluating of the program’s progress. 
“Alfasol” was quickly established as a best-practice 
and therefore has been considered as a model for 
the fight against illiteracy in Mozambique. Despite 
the differences in history and economic performance 
between Brazil and Mozambique both sides wanted to 
transfer the program. The reason for this motivation to 
transfer on the side of Mozambique can be seen in the 
cultural influence of Brazil on the Mozambican society 
and the shared classification as a poor country (Mo-
rais 2005, p.23-24). On the Brazilian side the program 
benefited from the active promotion of the program by 
AAPAS and the fact that it was in line with the general 
strategy of the Brazilian foreign policy (Morais 2005, 
p.27-30). 
The actual implementation ignored some major 
lessons of development practice. The program in 
Mozambique lacked ownership, which means that past 
local experiences were not embedded and cultural 
differences neglected. The fact that Portuguese is 
mother tongue to only a fraction of the population in 
Mozambique was ignored. This means that many peo-
ple had to learn a different language before they were 
able to fight their illiteracy. Furthermore, the teaching 
material was not adapted to the Mozambican form of 
Portuguese (Morais 2005, p.33-35).  
Notwithstanding the best-practice image and the 
resulting “how-to” approach the program’s Moz-
ambican version was different in some fundamental 
aspects. First of all the important aspect of the part-
nership structure was not implemented. There was no 
involvement of the private sector and Mozambican 
universities were left out. As mentioned above, in the 
original program universities were responsible for the 
actual implementation. After the Brazilian universities 
left Mozambique there was no instance to conti-
nue the program’s implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. Also, the important component of the 
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teacher’s training could not be continued (Morais 
2005, p.42-43). 
4.1.2  Health sector 
decentralization in Malawi
Although the process of decentralization in the health 
sector had already been on the agenda of the World 
Bank for Malawi, the 1993 World Development Report 
intensified efforts. In this report the importance of de-
centralization was stressed, donor organizations were 
advised to focus on countries willing for reforms only, 
and developing countries were urged to comply or 
otherwise loose support. In Malawi the implementati-
on of the health sector reforms was supported by the 
European Commission with funding and consultancy 
(Tambulasi 2013, p.85). 
The health sector decentralization was aided by 
“middlemen”, international experts who are experi-
enced in the process of reform implementation. Their 
approach to the transition of the Malawian health 
system was supplemented by the use of participa-
tory learning, formal training and capacity building. 
Participatory learning means that the officials of the 
Malawian Ministry of Health (MOH) “were actively 
involved in the structure formulation processes” (Tam-
bulasi 2013, p.89). For the formal academic training 
part MOH-officials got scholarships for universities in 
the UK, where they got a master’s degree in a relevant 
subject like health policy or health economics. The 
capacity building part mainly aimed at the district 
health offices, so that they were enabled to manage 
their new duties in a decentralized health system 
(Tambulasi 2013, p.90).  
Because of international pressure and incentives 
the Malawian politicians were very motivated to 
conduct the reform. However, bureaucratic resis-
tance in the MOH slowed down the implementation. 
The resistance occurred because of the feared loss of 
influence, power and resources. As a first tactic the 
MOH-bureaucrats did simply not implement activities 
within the scheduled timetable. Furthermore they 
tried to slow down the process by reallocating trained 
personnel to other ministries. Also, the MOH tried 
to persuade the president to keep the health system 
centralized for longer (Tambulasi 2013, p.94).
But how were these resistance measures handled? 
First, donor organizations applied some pressure on 
the government and the MOH. Loans and financial 
aid were linked to a binding timetable for the imple-
mentation of the reform. The external pressure led to 
a “hide and seek tactic” by the government in order to 
bypass the actions of the MOH. Money for health fa-
cilities was directly transferred to the local assemblies 
without informing the MOH. The increasing pressure 
made the MOH implement the fiscal aspects of the 
reform but there were still efforts made to maintain 
control by allocating a bigger part of the budget to 
central authorities (Tambulasi 2013, p.97-99). 
The case of Malawi showed that policy transfer stron-
gly depends on the performance of the stakeholders 
involved, especially on the executing bureaucracy 
(Tambulasi 2013, p.82). It is often ignored that these 
bureaucrats are not compliant government actors and 
are able to effectively block developments, which in 
this case means the transfer of a policy. Despite the 
need for aid, the personal agenda of bureaucrats can 
differ from the counties agenda and external pressure 
and assistance is needed to circumvent their position 
(Tambulasi 2013, p.99-100). 
4.1.3  Transfer of Chile´s 
“Programa de Mejoramiento de la 
Gestion (PMG)” to Mexico
The “Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestion (PMG)“ 
is a performance management tool introduced by 
the Chilean Government in 1998 as part of broader 
performance system. The system has been reviewed 
by the OECD and the World Bank (WB) and received 
very good ratings. The PMG development passed 
through several stages from an internal improvement 
tool in 1998 to a system with external reviewers under 
the ISO-9001 Norm, an international standardized 
quality management system to ensure the fulfillment 
of stakeholders needs while meeting statutory and 
regulatory requirements, in 2005 (Dussauge-Laguna 
2013, p. 170-171). 
Between 2006 and 2007 the Mexican government 
showed interest in transferring the technology to their 
country. This interest was part of a process of trans-
formation of the public administration in Mexico, set 
in motion by a presidential decree in 2006. Mexican 
officials first gained knowledge about the PMG in Chile 
at the OECD´s Senior Budget Officials (SBO) meetings 
between 2003 and 2004, where Carlos Hurtado from 
the Mexican Ministry of Finance met the responsible 
head of the Chilean management reform program. At 
the same time officials from the Mexican Ministry for 
Social Development gathered information about the 
reforms for another program. The Chilean and Mexican 
officials were also brought together at an international 
seminar by the WB and the IDB in Washington. Fur-
thermore, the IDB provided funds for the implementa-
tion of the program in Mexico which gave officials the 
opportunity to visit their Chilean counterparts and esta-
blish direct contacts (Dussauge-Laguna 2013, p.174).
Despite the profound insights into the Chilean process 
the program that was finally implemented in Mexico 
was radically different. One reason for this was the 
conflict between the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) and 
the Ministry of Public Administration (SFP) about the 
goals and the contents of the Mexican PMG. While the 
SHCP wanted to follow the original purpose of auste-
rity and budget-control measures, the SFP preferred 
to develop a tool for administrative modernization 
and anti-corruption policy (Dussauge-Laguna 2013, 
p.177). Subsequently the Mexican PMG was not em-
bedded in a broader performance system but became 
a stand-alone tool. In the end the Chilean PMG was a 
design-example for the Mexican PEMG. 
Nevertheless the case study shows how policy can 
be transferred between countries. The process was 
initiated through international forums but pushed 
further by national officials. International Organiza-
tions helped and influenced the process, but never in a 
coercive way (Dussauge-Laguna 2013, p.182-183). 
4.1.4  Interim conclusions
This chapter presented only a few examples of policy 
transfer. However, it is possible to draw tentative 
lessons. Firstly, policy transfer strongly depends on 
the persons responsible for the process. In the phase 
of agenda-setting NGOs, International Organizations 
or even citizens can be crucial for the future success 
of a project. They can actively promote ideas, “best-
practices” and concepts. Also, especially Interna-
tional organizations are able to bring the relevant 
actors together and facilitate an exchange of ideas. 
Knowledge institutions or NGOs on the other hand 
can function as information carrier and support the 
implementation process. Likewise it is important that 
officials like the bureaucrats in the recipient countries 
are able and willing to implement the reforms. It is 
crucial that they are educated in the relevant matters 
and that they put aside reservations against a policy 
because of a differing personal agenda. In this process 
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International Organizations and NGO can help by 
conducting qualification measures and by conciliating 
in conflict cases, but also through coercive measures as 
a last resort.  
Secondly, it is important to consider all aspects of 
the model. According to Carroll and Common, “typi-
cally, only one or more aspects of an already existing 
policy, [tailored] to meet their own particular needs” 
is transferred (Carroll/Common 2013, p.188). But in 
some cases important parts are left out, which changes 
the whole project and endangers its success. However, 
omissions of program components can be justified in 
the adjustment process.
Thirdly, it is necessary to carefully observe cultural dif-
ferences and similarities. For example, political cultures 
can be skeptical of change in general or bureaucrats 
fear loss of power. Problems can arise if policy concepts 
originate in e.g. a former colonial power or a certain re-
gion (Carroll/Common 2013, p.189). On the other hand 
cultural similarities can be important in the selection 
process of a transferable policy or be helpful in the 
process of convincing governments to transfer a policy.  
All presented case studies call for more research in this 
area in order to validate the findings. 
4.2  Policy diffusion 
The following chapter will summarize studies dealing 
with the diffusion of social policies. The guiding ques-
tions are:
• Did policy diffusion occur?
• Why does policy diffusion occur?
• Which framework conditions (mediating variables) 
   or domestic factors matter? 
4.2.1  Relevance of policy diffusion
That international interdependencies matter, i.e. 
diffusion processes occur, is confirmed by a number of 
studies. This holds across different policy areas such as 
pensions (Brooks 2005, Brooks 2007, Rasmussen/Skor-
ge/Stoltenberg 2012, Weyland 2005, Weyland 2007), 
labour market policies (Kemmerling 2007, Gilardi 
2010), health policies (Gilardi/Füglister/Luyet 2009, 
Weyland 2007), or social policy in general (Jahn 2006). 
These studies cover different regions worldwide, albeit 
the majority is focusing on OECD countries (Gilardi/
Füglister/Luyet 2009, Jahn 2006, Kemmerling 2007, 
Gilardi 2010, Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg 2012). 
Two studies cover a broad country sample including 
countries at different income levels and in different 
regions worldwide (Brooks 2005, Brooks 2007) and 
two studies focus on Latin America (Weyland 2005, 
Weyland 2007). Brooks (2007) finds variation among 
regions with the strongest impact of peer dynamics 
among Eastern Europe and Central Asian nations, 
medium impact in Latin America and no significant 
impact for OECD countries.
Further, diffusion does not entail simply copying 
one model. In his comprehensive study of the Latin 
American wave of pension privatization during 
the 19080s and 1990s, Weyland (2005)  points out 
that although original model’s design characteristics 
prevail the adaptation to specific domestic needs often 
occurs (Weyland 2005, p.267-268). He also cites the 
example of the diffusion of Bismarck style social in-
surance: “For instance, social insurance schemes were 
instituted (…) in countries with large industries and a 
numerically and organizationally strong working class 
(such as Germany), but also in nations with very little 
of either (such as Uruguay)” (Weyland 2005, p.268).
A few studies analyze differences in diffusion within 
the same general policy area. Brooks (2007) stresses 
that diffusion is conditional on the type of policy or 
the characteristics of a policy innovation depending on 
whether it imposes high or low sunk costs on adopters. 
She finds that “peer diffusion weighs heavily in the 
adoption of the costly “funded” defined-contribution 
pension reform model, and does so principally among 
middle-income nations, while the less-costly “notio-
nal” defined-contribution pension reform is not gover-
ned by diffusion.” (Brooks 2007) Kemmerling (2007), 
focussing on active and passive labour market policies, 
finds diffusion processes to matter for active but not 
for passive labour market policies.
In addition, diffusion processes seem to impact on 
different types of policy changes as well. Following the 
typology introduced by Hall 1993 (see chapter 3) they 
include third order changes, i.e. goal shifting changes 
or structural reforms as the privatization of pensi-
ons systems throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Brooks 
2005, Brooks 2007, Weyland 2005, Weyland 2007), 
second order changes, i.e. a change of instruments 
(Gilardi/Füglister/Luyet 2009) and first order changes, 
i.e. adjustment in levels such as changes in contribu-
tion rates or benefits (Gilardi 2010, Kemmerling 2007, 
Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg 2012). 
4.2.2  Explaining policy diffusion - 
Mechanisms
Assessing the relevance of either coercive or voluntary 
transfers Brooks (2005, 2007) finds strong empirical 
support that voluntary peer dynamics matter. She finds 
no empirical evidence that pension reforms in Latin 
America or Eastern Europe were influenced by World 
Bank requirements (using World Bank loans and credits 
as measure). Likewise, one major finding of Weyland 
(2005) analyzing the role of International Finance Ins-
titutions for privatization of pensions in Latin America 
is that external pressures might constrain the decision 
space of national policy makers, but surely do not de-
termine domestic policy choices. External actors might 
even be of strategic use for national policy makers as 
Weyland 2005 puts it: “Instead, to enhance their bar-
gaining leverage with domestic opponents or hesitant 
political leaders, reform minded experts often ask IFIs 
to “impose” conditions on their country.” (Weyland 
2005, p. 273). Significant autonomy for national policy 
makers remains and international diffusion processes 
thus must be further explained by voluntary interde-
pendencies (Weyland 2005). 
Among the three different voluntary mechanisms 
(learning, emulation, competition) the learning me-
chanism is the most frequently researched mechanism 
within the policy diffusion literature. Those studies 
considering learning find mostly empirical evidence 
that learning mechanisms are at play (Weyland 2005, 
Weyland 2007, Gilardi 2010, Gilardi/Füglister/Luyet 
2009). Only Kemmerling (2007) finds no empirical 
support for the learning hypothesis. In his study on 
the diffusion of labour market policies in the OECD, 
countries do not pick up from successful countries. 
Contrary, Gilardi/Füglister/Luyet (2009) show that the 
adoption of provider payment mechanism is influ-
enced by the performance of respective approaches 
abroad: Adoption is more likely when experience 
of others shows that reforms lead to lower health 
expenditures or a slower rise in health expenditures.  
Further, learning effects are non-stationary: Learning 
effects become more important over time. Policy-
makers seem to be more sensitive when a policy is 
already widespread than when it is a fresh innovation. 
Likewise, Weyland (2005) identifies learning as the 
most influential mechanism in explaining diffusion of 
privatization pension reforms in Latin America, but he 
shows that learning is clearly influenced by cognitive 
shortcuts (bounded rationality) such as selectivity in 
information processing with a focus on data readily 
available, overgeneralizations and inferential “sti-
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ckiness”, i.e. not fully adopting a model to domestic 
needs but sticking to certain core values irrespective 
of whether or not they fit to domestic conditions 
(Weyland 2005, p. 281-294). Gilardi (2010) points out 
that relevant outcomes from which policy makers 
learn include both policy and political consequences 
of reforms. Further, prevailing ideologies respectively 
prior beliefs about effectiveness of policies influence 
the propensity to learn. 
Empirical evidence on the role of emulation is scarce 
and inconclusive. As concerns emulation, Weyland 
(2005, 2007) finds that the role of emulation differs 
among policy areas. Shared international norms did not 
play a role for explaining diffusion of pension privatiza-
tions in Latin America. For health-care reform in Latin 
America, however, shared international norms mattered. 
These shared international norms derived in particu-
lar from the successful establishment of the norm of 
universal coverage as an important objective for all 
countries by the World Health Organization since the 
end of the 1970s (Weyland 2007, p. 170-172).10 Gilardi/
Füglister/Luyet (2009) indirectly conclude that emulati-
on is not a relevant factor for hospital financing reforms 
in the OECD: They argue, if emulation was important, 
then the role of other factors should decline as norms 
become stronger over time. However, as they find 
learning effects to increase over time, they conclude 
that norm-based explanations do not account for policy 
diffusion of hospital financing reforms. Using the num-
ber of ILO conventions a country has enacted to capture 
the influence of international norms on policy diffusion, 
Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg (2012) find only a mo-
dest impact for both, standard and minimum pensi-
ons.  However, two aspects are noteworthy: Although 
modest for both, the impact on minimum pensions is 
slightly higher than the impact on average pensions. 
The effect is also negative for standard pensions and 
positive for minimum pensions. This could suggest that 
international norms are more beneficial for low income 
groups or labor market outsiders (Rasmussen/Skorge/
Stoltenberg 2012, p.22-23), while policies for labour 
market insiders (usually the majority of the population) 
are stronger impacted by domestic factors.   
The role of competition is almost non-existent in 
studies of policy diffusion of social policies. The only 
reference was found in Weyland (2005). He argues 
that economic competition cannot explain diffusion 
processes of Latin American pension privatizations: If 
competitive pressures were relevant one would expect 
diffusion processes to follow an exponential curve: The 
more countries adopt a policy model, the greater the 
pressure for laggards to follow. As the actual observed 
diffusion pattern rather resembles an S-shaped curve 
(meaning that diffusion decelerates over time) he 
concludes that economic competition cannot account 
for explaining the diffusion process (Weyland 2005, 
p. 280-281). No reference was found with regard to 
the role of political or social competition. Greenhill, 
Mosley and Prakash (2009) find that labour rights tend 
to be strengthened in countries that trade intensively 
with partners where these rights are already well 
protected. In this context, competition improves upon 
existing standards (race to the top) instead of inducing 
a race to the bottom.
In line with the lack of theoretical underpinnings, 
interlinkages between mechanisms have not been 
considered yet at the empirical level.
4.2.3  Explaining policy diffusion - 
Framework requirements 
and domestic factors
Considering the framework requirements or me-
diating variables explained in chapter 3 available 
empirical evidence points to the relevance of the 
specific qualities of the problem at hand: Increasing 
“problem pressures” (e.g. higher unemployment levels, 
increasing health expenditures, ageing population) 
increases the likelihood for policy diffusion (Brooks 
2005, Brooks 2007, Gilardi 2009, Kemmerling 2007). In 
terms of similarities and proximity between countries 
the mediating variable most frequently considered is 
geographic proximity. In all studies analyzing geogra-
phic proximity a positive relationship between proxi-
mity and diffusion is confirmed (Brooks 2005, Kem-
merling 2007, Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg 2012, 
Weyland 2005). However, as Weyland (2005) points 
out with reference to the diffusion of ‘Chilean type 
pension reforms’ the relationship is time dependent: 
Diffusion occurred first in the region where the inno-
vation was designed, and later it spread to other parts 
of the world. Further, Weyland (2005) does not find a 
systematic relationship between economic similarity 
(e.g. in term of income level) and diffusion.  A positive 
relationship between economic similarity in terms 
of income level, economic growth and openness and 
diffusion is found in Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg 
(2012). The role of cultural and political/institutional 
similarities have not been considered within the policy 
diffusion literature on social policies.11 The same 
holds for the role of international embeddedness. 
Apart from international interdependencies a num-
ber of domestic factors are examined as well. These 
factors comprise of political constraints (e.g. ideology, 
political fragmentation, political system, quality of 
government), financial constraints (e.g. budget balan-
ce) or economic constraints (income level, economic 
growth). However, outcomes are often inconclusive 
or not-comparable across studies due to different 
methodologies. For example, as regards political 
constraints Brooks (2005) finds an important role 
for political institutions: In countries with a higher 
degree of political fragmentation and strong demo-
cratic freedom the role of privatizing pension systems 
10 These shared international norms derived in particular from the successful establishment of the norm of universal coverage as an impor-
tant objective for all countries by the World Health Organization since the end of the 1970s. 
decreases. However, in their study of pension reforms 
in the OECD Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg (2012) 
find only a weak impact of the number of veto points 
on diffusion. Similar to Brooks (2005) Gilardi/Füglis-
ter/Luyet (2009) in their study on diffusion of health 
financing reforms find a negative effect of veto points, 
which however is time-dependent: Countries with 
more veto points simply need more time and “catch up”, 
i.e. veto points are not blocking, but slowing diffusion. 
Interestingly, Rasmussen/Skorge/Stoltenberg (2012) 
find a positive impact of the quality of government 
on diffusion. As concerns domestic economic factors 
Brooks (2005) finds that neither wealth (per capital 
income) nor the size of the economy (gross domestic 
product) are relevant for policy change. However, in 
Brooks (2007) wealth does mediate the importance of 
diffusion in domestic policy choices.
Therefore up to now it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions or to establish a systematic influence of 
the difference factors discussed. Probably the most 
what can be said by today is that –not surprisingly – 
domestic factors matter and do influence diffusion 
processes and policy change. 
4.2.4  Interim conclusions
Given the limited number of empirical studies analy-
zing the different mechanisms the empirical evidence 
is far from being conclusive, but is at least pointing 
into certain directions: To explain international 
interdependencies voluntary linkages are important, 
whereas external pressure or coercion cannot be 
confirmed by (the very few number of) studies dealing 
with the subject matter. Both, learning and emulation, 
need to be considered, but no conclusions can yet be 
drawn under which conditions both effects are more 
or less likely to occur or how theses mechanisms 
interact. Interestingly, in the two cases examining the 
role of competition, economic competition played 
11 Geographic proximity might be considered as an indicator for cultural similarity, but its validity is at least questionable: Sharing the same 
borders is not guarantee for cultural alikeness.
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either no role or a positive role, i.e. strengthening labour 
rights. As regards the mediating variables geographic 
proximity and similarity between countries seem to 
matter, although the effect might decrease over time. 
Domestic factors such as political constraints (e.g. ideo-
logy, political fragmentation, political system, quality of 
government), financial constraints (e.g. budget balance) 
or economic constraints (income level, economic growth) 
play an important role (all studies found systematic im-
pacts of various domestic factors), but the current state 
of the art does not allow any systematic conclusions. 
The final conclusions address the last research question 
outlined in the introduction: Based on the current 
state of the art, what (preliminary) lessons can be 
deduced for the international dialogue with global 
development partners on social protection and – in 
terms of ‘lessons learnt regarding the identification of 
aspects we do not know yet’ - what are the knowledge 
gaps? Generally speaking, it needs to be kept in mind 
that the empirical evidence is still limited and often 
rather anecdotal so that any ‘lessons learnt’ can only 
be ‘tentative lessons learnt’.
5.  Conclusion
5.1  Facilitating policy transfer/
diffusion – Lessons learnt 
To start with, the literature on international policy 
transfer and policy diffusion clearly establishes that 
voluntary international interdependencies matter: 
Decisions in one country are systematically linked to 
decisions made in another country. This holds ac-
ross different policy areas (social protection, health, 
education) as well as for small and large-scale policy 
changes. Further, policy diffusion and policy transfer 
are observed in different regions and in countries at 
all income levels, but empirical evidence for low and 
middle income countries is less available than for high 
income country (see chapter 5.2). Further, it seems 
that adaption instead of simply copying models is the 
rule: Whereas copying of policies rarely occurs, policies 
transferred are frequently adopted in certain ways, alt-
hough the core model remains. Thus, one rather firm 
conclusion is that changes in social protection po-
licies or in a broader sense social policies cannot be 
attributed to domestic factors or coercive external 
influences only. In fact, based on the empirical evi-
dence available the role of coercive influences seems 
to be rather neglectable. Domestic (political, econo-
mic or cultural) factors instead do play a crucial role, 
but no conclusive empirical evidence is available.
The qualitative studies point to the fact that change 
agents (e.g. ‘policy entrepreneurs’) and organizations 
involved in the transfer process matter. For example, 
for agenda setting, both International Organzations and 
Non-Governmental Organizations seem to be impor-
tant actors within the transfer process. For implemen-
tation the role of Knowledge Institutions and again 
Non-Governmental Organizations are pointed out.
In terms of transfer/diffusion mechanisms empiri-
cal evidence points to the relevance of learning as 
transmission channel for international diffusion. Policy 
makers do in fact look to other countries in order to 
find out what works. The responsiveness to learn from 
other countries might be influenced by factors such 
as domestic problem pressure (not surprisingly) or 
proximity and (economic) similarity, but is not strictly 
conditional on the latter two. Contrary empirical 
evidence is available as well. Further, the relationship 
might also be time-dependent, meaning that initially 
countries close to each other learn from each other and 
subsequently policies diffuse within a larger radius. 
However, even if learning matters it cannot be taken 
for granted that international interdependencies 
lead to better domestic policies. Or as Elkins and 
Simmons (2004) put it ,,The question, then, is whe-
ther diffusion is responsible for a nation‘s squeezing 
into ill-fitting but fashionable institutions or whether 
it leads them to the most functional and efficient 
ones available?“ (Elkins/Simmons 2004: 15). The 
answer is: It depends. One reason for this is that 
learning is not always strictly ‘rational’, but ‘boun-
ded rational’: Everyone is prone to selective infor-
mation biases, overgeneralizations or ‘anchoring’, 
i.e. attaching specific weight to status quo or ‘initial 
values’. Here lies probably one of the challenges for 
international networks to structure communication 
processes in a way which facilitates “less” boun-
ded learning. Further, emulation, i.e. factors such 
as shared norms, quest for legitimacy or prevailing 
ideologies influence which policy options are consi-
dered and how they are evaluated.
 
One remark regarding methodology: The different em-
pirical research approaches are complementing each 
other as quantitative analysis can identify broad and 
general patterns whereas qualitative analysis points 
out detailed information on underlying dynamics. 
5.2  Facilitating policy transfer/
diffusion – Knowledge gaps and 
further research needs
Given the rather recent origin of both research programs 
it is not surprising that several ‘knowledge gaps’ exist: 
Firstly, there is a lack of empirical evidence on dif-
fusion/transfer in middle and low income countries 
as most empirical evidence focusses on high income 
countries. The majority of transfer studies focus on 
the nation-state level (Holzinger et al. 2007, p. 13), e.g. 
transfers within the European Union, the OECD, or 
transfers from International Organizations to states. 
Thus, the vast majority of studies are concerned with 
transfers between developed countries (see Evans 
2004, p. 5). Transfers from developed to developing 
and vice versa, or between developing countries have 
not yet gained widespread academic interest. 
Secondly, the recent wave of extending social protec-
tion in low and middle income countries has not yet 
been taken up by the literature at all (except those very 
few qualitative case studies as presented in chapter 4.1). 
Thirdly, both research programs still score unsatisfac-
torily at the explanatory level: “Policies diffuse, but 
why?” (Gilardi 2010, p.650): Although the identifi-
cation of specific diffusion mechanisms (learning, 
emulation, competition) and framework requirements 
(qualities of the policy, proximity and similarity 
between countries, international embeddedness) is 
already an achievement, the current state of the 
art is still far away from providing a unified frame-
work. Inter-linkages between mechanisms remain 
unexplored, so does the overall relationship between 
mechanisms, framework requirements and domestic 
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factors. For example regarding the mechanisms of 
learning and emulation (socialization and legitimacy), 
it remains an analytical challenge to establish if dif-
fusion or transfer was motivated by “learning advan-
cements or mere ideational trends, the formation of 
ideational hegemony or cognitive diffusion without 
learning advancements” (Toens/Landwehr 2008, p. 
110). This vagueness provides also a severe hindrance 
for empirical research, which up to now only provides 
suggestive evidence on some variables (‘yes, learning 
seems to matter, well and so does emulation’), but 
does not produce any convincing answers yet. Further, 
as concerns empirical research the qualitative studies 
almost exclusively rely on cases where policy transfer 
took place. However, cases where policy transfer did 
not take place or failed need to be included as well. 
As a consequence, this heterogeneity and general 
ambiguity pervading the studies of policy diffusion 
and transfer has until now challenged the cumula-
tiveness and comparability of empirical results as well 
as the theoretical sophistication of the two concepts 
(see Maggetti/Gilardi 2013, p. 2, 3). Or as Gilardi puts 
it “The disconnect between theories and empirical 
analysis is currently the main problem of this research 
program, and progress on this issue is essential to 
move beyond generic claims that interdependence 
matters and policies diffuse.” (Gilardi 2010, p.660).
Fourthly, the fora through which (mediated) diffusi-
on occurs (e.g. policy networks) present up to now a 
“black box”. Almost no attention has yet been devoted 
to analyze the role of communication resp. interaction 
mechanisms (diffusion/transfer surely pre-suppose some 
form of direct or indirect “interaction”) or the role of 
governance structures in which interactions take place. 
Fifthly, in this context it also seems essential to extend 
empirical research methodologies applied in the 
study of policy diffusion and transfer. Up to know, the 
empirical evidence is based on either qualitative case 
studies or on quantitative studies relying on aggregate 
data. However, as ultimately any diffusion is based on 
individual decision-making it seems promising to ack-
nowledge the importance by collecting and analyzing 
survey data. 
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